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We study the impact of finite-size effects on the key rate of continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-
independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD), considering two-mode Gaussian attacks. Inspired by the
parameter estimation technique developed in by Ruppert et al. [Phys. Rev. A 90, 062310 (2014)], we adapt it to
study CV-MDI-QKD and, assuming realistic experimental conditions, we analyze the impact of finite-size effects
on the key rate. We find that the performance of the protocol approaches the ideal one, increasing the block size,
and, most importantly, that blocks between 106 and 109 data points may provide key rates ∼10−2 bit/use over
metropolitan distances.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.96.042332
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] promises to allow un-
conditionally secure (theoretical) communication. Its strength
relies on two main elements: The encoding of classical
information (0 and 1 bits) into nonorthogonal quantum states,
and the impossibility of perfect discrimination between them.
In a conventional QKD protocol two users, Alice and Bob,
share quantum systems which are unavoidably corrupted
every time that an eavesdropper (Eve) tries to access the
information encoded. This perturbation is detectable and
allows the parties to quantify the amount of error correction
and privacy amplification to apply to the shared data, in order
to reduce Eve’s information to a negligible amount. Then they
can use the obtained key in an one-time pad protocol [2].
The fundamental mechanism of QKD is clearly pre-
served also in more complex (repeater-based) communica-
tion configurations [3,4], aiming at activating long-distance
communication and quantum networks [5,6]. In the basic
point-to-point scenario, the recent work [7] succeeded in estab-
lishing the secret-key capacity of various quantum channels.
The combined use of relative entropy of entanglement [8–
10] and teleportation stretching (which reduces any adaptive
protocol to a block form) enables one to compute the two-way
capacity of many important quantum channels (see Ref. [7] and
further works [11–15] for the correct definition and rigorous
use of teleportation stretching in quantum communication,
quantum metrology, and channel discrimination). The result
of Ref. [7] sets the fundamental limit of point-to-point QKD
and, as such, it marks the edge when private communication
inevitably needs quantum repeaters. This benchmark has
already had a wide application in recent works [16–29].
Continuous-variable (CV) quantum systems [30], in par-
ticular Gaussian systems [31], emerged recently as very
promising carriers of quantum information. They have the
potential to be used for high-rate quantum communication
because, rather than using single-photon quantum states and
photon counting, they employ bright coherent states and
homodyne detections, which naturally boost the achievable
key rate. Based on this premise, CV-QKD protocols [32]
have been proposed using one-way [33–35] or two-way
quantum communications [36]. Some one-way schemes have
been experimentally realized [37–40], over remarkably long
distances [41,42]. Additional theoretical analysis has been
focused on QKD with thermal states [43–48], with an
experiment performed [49]. Recently, CV-QKD has been
extended to a network configuration [50,51], implementing the
general idea of measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
[52,53]. Here two parties, unable to access a secure direct link,
can be assisted by an intermediate relay (even untrusted) to
establish a secure channel.
Many challenges [54] need to be solved before private quan-
tum networking can become a mature technology. However,
CV-QKD protocols and their security analysis have progressed
rapidly toward more practical and realistic assumptions. In this
respect, the incorporation of finite-size effects is particularly
important. In fact, when we assume that the parties exchange
only a finite number of signals, one expects the deterioration
of the key rate. In addition to this, finite-size analysis is also
the first step toward a more general security proof within
the composable framework [55–57]. While the theoretical
study of the impact of finite-size effects has been done in
several previous works [58–60], CV-MDI QKD has been so
far investigated neglecting this aspect and limiting the analysis
to the asymptotic regime [61].
In order to start filling this gap, in this work we focus
on evaluating the impact of finite-size effects on the key
rate of a CV-MDI protocol. This study is important not only
because these effects have not yet evaluated in detail for MDI
protocols, but also because this type of analysis represents
a necessary step to refine the security analysis of CV-MDI
toward the more complete composable scenario. We perform
a detailed study of the impact of finite-size effects for both
the symmetric [51] and asymmetric [50,62] configurations.
We extend the parameter estimation methods described in
Ref. [60], for conventional one-way protocols, to relay-based
communication. We consider Gaussian two-mode attacks
which have been already extensively studied in one-way
schemes [63], two-way protocols [64,65], and the CV-MDI
setup [66].
We remark that, in our analysis, we work within the
Gaussian assumption. This allows us to develop the statistical
estimation theory of the relevant parameters of the channels,
which are their transmissivities and excess noise. The confi-
dence interval of the estimated parameters are then quantified
using their variances and setting a 6.5-σ accuracy, which
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allows us to grant a very low error probability of ǫPE = 10−10
during the parameter estimation procedure. The confidence
intervals are used to select the worst-case scenario, choosing
lower transmissivity and higher excess noise in the links.
In order to compute the key rate, we explicitly include a
correction term  which accounts for the use of the Holevo
function (which is an asymptotic quantity) in the finite-size
regime [60]. The key rate is then numerically computed, using
the estimated values of transmissivity and noise, and optimized
over free parameters, which are the Gaussian modulation of the
signals and the ratio between the number of signals used in the
parameter estimation and total number of signals exchanged.
As expected, we find that, by increasing the block-size of
the signals exchanged, one recovers the performance under
ideal condition. Most importantly, one has that block size in
the range of 106 ÷ 109 signals can provide a positive key rate of
about 10−2 bit/use, in the presence of high excess noise of 0.01
vacuum shot noise units (SNU) and attenuation compatible
with the use of standard optical fibers over metropolitan
distances. The structure of this paper is the following: In
Sec. II, we present the details of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
In Sec. III, we describe the parameter estimation. In Sec. IV,
we discuss the results obtained, and finally Sec. V is for the
conclusions.
II. PROTOCOL, EAVESDROPPING, AND KEY RATE
For the sake of clarity, let us first describe the working
mechanism of CV-MDI QKD from the prepare and measure
perspective, where Alice and Bob send coherent states, |α〉
and |β〉, to an intermediate relay. The amplitudes α and β
are Gaussian modulated; i.e., each party sends to the relay
an average thermal state with variance VM  0. The duty of
the relay is very simple: It mixes the incoming signals on
a balanced beam splitter and performs a CV Bell detection,
i.e., two conjugate homodyne detections on q− and p+, at the
output ports of the balanced beam splitter [67].
Then, the relay broadcasts the obtained values of γ :=
(q− + ip+)/
√
2. This new variable can also be written as
γ := α − β∗ + ˆδ, where ˆδ is the detection noise. It is then clear
that the relay acts as a correlator for the parties, who can each
infer the other variable (α, β) from a simple postprocessing
[50].
The broadcast of the Bell detection outcomes, γ , does
not help the eavesdropper who is forced to attack the
communication links to the relay in order to obtain information
on amplitudes α and β. This operation introduces detectable
excess of noise that the parties can use to quantify Eve’s
knowledge on α and β (accessible information). From this
stage on, the protocol works as any other QKD scheme
[1], with the Alice and Bob implementing enough error
correction and privacy amplification to reduce Eve’s accessible
information to a negligible amount.
A. Two-mode eavesdropping
A powerful approach to study the security of any quantum
cryptographic protocol is to adopt the entanglement-based
(EB) representation, where the description of the dynamics
takes place in a dilated Hilbert space, which allows us to
FIG. 1. The figure shows the EB representation of CV-MDI QKD.
Alice and Bob have TMSV states with modes (a,A) and (b,B). Local
modes a and b are kept by the parties, while A and B are sent to the
relay through two links with transmittance τA and τB . When Alice
and Bob heterodyne the local modes, the traveling ones A and B are
projected onto coherent states |α〉 and |β〉. The relay performs a Bell
measurement and broadcasts the outcomes γ , creating correlation
between the parties: For instance, Bob recovers Alice variable β by
subtracting his variable α from the relay’s outputs γ . The Gaussian
attack on the links is simulated by Eve using ancillas E1 and E2
and thermal noise ωA  1 and ωB  1, respectively. These ancillary
modes are, in general, two-mode correlated (see text for more details).
The ancillary outputs are stored in a quantum memory for a later
measurement.
work with pure states. The EB representation of CV-MDI
QKD scheme is given in Fig. 1: Alice’s and Bob’s sources
of coherent states are purified assuming to start from a
two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) states ρaA and ρbB ,
whose zero-mean Gaussian states are completely described
by the following identical covariance matrices (CM)
VaA = VbB =
(
μI
√
μ2 − 1Z√
μ2 − 1Z μI
)
, (1)
where μ = VM + 1 and Z =diag(1,−1).
Modes A and B are sent through the links, while local
ones, a and b, are heterodyned. The measurements projects the
traveling modes into coherent states |α〉 and |β〉 respectively.
The channel attenuation on modes A and B is modeled by
two beam splitters with transmissivities τA and τB , with 0 
τA,B  1. These process Alice’s and Bob’s signals with a pair
of Eve’s ancillary systemsE1 andE2 which, in general, belong
to a wider reservoir of modes controlled by the eavesdropper
and including the set e (which can be neglected in the limit of
infinite signals exchanged [68]).
We can then write the dilation of the initial Eve’s state as
a two-mode Gaussian state σE1E2 described by the following
general CM:
VE1E2 =
(
ωAI G
G ωBI
)
, (2)
where G =diag(g,g′). The correlation parameters g and g′
satisfy the constraints given in Ref. [69], while ωA,ωB  1
account for the thermal noise injected by Eve, on each
link, during the attack. When g = g′ = 0, the two-mode
state σE1E2 is a tensor product, which leads to a standard
single-mode collective attack realized by two independent
entangling cloners [38]. By contrast for g = 0 and g′ = 0, the
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two entangling cloners are not independent, and the optimal
attack is two-mode coherent, as described in Refs. [50,51,66].
B. Key rate
The EB representation is useful for the security analysis
because Alice-Bob reduced output states ρab|γ and ρb|γα ,
described by the CMs Vab|γ and Vb|γα respectively (see
Appendix A for further details), have the same entropies of
Eve’s output states. Under the ideal assumption that the parties
exchange infinitely many signals (N ≫ 1), and assuming that
the parties reconcile over Alice’s data to build the key, one
bounds Eve’s accessible information by the Holevo function,
IH := S(ρab|γ )− S(ρb|γα), (3)
where S(.) is the von Neumann entropy. For Gaussian states,
we have the simple expression [31]
S =
∑
x
h(x),
where x is the generic symplectic eigenvalue of the CM, and
h(x)= x + 1
2
log2
x + 1
2
− x − 1
2
log2
x − 1
2
, (4)
x→∞→ log2
e
2
x. (5)
We then can write an expression for the key rate
K∞ := ξIAB − IH , (6)
where ξ  1 quantifies the inefficiency of error correction and
privacy amplification protocols [70–72] and IAB is Alice-Bob
mutual information. This is given by
IAB =
1
2
log2
V
q
b|γ + 1
V
q
b|γα + 1
+ 1
2
log2
V
p
b|γ + 1
V
p
b|γα + 1
, (7)
with V qb|γ (V pb|γ ) and V qb|γα (V pb|γα) being the variances of CMs
Vab|γ and Vb|γα for the position (momentum) quadrature.
These CMs are given in Appendix A. The key rate is
then function of parameters ξ, ωA, ωB , τA, and τB and the
Gaussian modulation VM . Its expression can be found in the
supplemental information of Ref. [50].
III. CHANNEL PARAMETER ESTIMATION
In a practical implementation of any QKD protocol, Alice
and Bob can only exchange a finite number of signals. In
addition, they can only use a portion of these to build the
key, because the others are used to estimate the channel
parameters. In this section, we provide a description of
CV-MDI QKD, quantifying the impact of finite-size effects
and the performance of the protocol. To perform this analysis,
we adapt the theory developed in Ref. [60] for one-way CV
QKD. We determine the channel parameters (transmissivity
and excess noise) within confidence intervals. Then we choose
the worst-case scenario, picking the lower transmissivity and
higher excess noise within their confidence intervals, so as to
minimize the key rate.
A. Losses and excess noise at the relay outputs
The outputs variables of the relay are quadratures q−,
relative to mode −, and p+ for mode +. These depend on the
evolution of Alice’s and Bob’s traveling modes A = (qA, pA)
and B = (qB, pB ). In terms of these input field quadratures,
one can then write the following relations:
q− =
1√
2
(√τBqB −√τAqA)+ qN , (8)
p+ =
1√
2
(√τBpB +√τApA)+ pN , (9)
where qN = qǫ + qsn and pN = pǫ + psn are noise terms
accounting for both excess noise and quantum shot noise
coming from the signal modes as well as Eve’s ancillary
modes. Their variances are given by
VqN = 1+ Vq,ǫ, VpN = 1+ Vp,ǫ, (10)
with
Vq,ǫ = k − gu, Vp,ǫ = k + g′u, (11)
and
k = (1− τB)(ωB − 1)+ (1− τA)(ωA − 1)
2
, (12)
u =
√
(1− τB)(1− τA), (13)
where g and g′ have been defined in Eq. (2).
Now we describe in more detail the parameter estimation
procedure. Alice and Bob’s Gaussian modulation VM is
assumed to be a known parameter. We need to estimate the
channel’s transmissivity τA, τB and variance of the excess
noisesVq,ǫ andVp,ǫ , with their confidence intervals. Assuming
that m Gaussian distributed signals are used for this task, we
associate to Aq,i (Ap,i) and Bq,i (Bp,i), for i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m},
the empirical realizations of the field quadrature of the
traveling modes. By contrast, we denote by Rq,i and Rp,i the
realizations of the relay outputs. Let first discuss the dynamics
of the quadrature q. From Eq. (8) one can write the estimator
of transmissivity τA as follows:
τˆAq =
2
V 2M
ˆC2ARq ,
where the covariance CARq =
√
τA/2VM has maximum likeli-
hood estimator given by
ˆCARq =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Aq,iRq,i,
and to which one can associate the following variance (see
Appendix C for more details):
Var(τˆAq) = 8τA
m
(
τA +
τB
2
)[
1+ Vq,N(
τA + τB2
)
VM
]
. (14)
Very similar relations hold for the estimator of τA obtained
considering the other output of the relay, p+. We can write the
estimator of the covariance CARp , which is given by
ˆCARp =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Ap,iRp,i,
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and then using Eq. (9) one can write the estimator of the
transmissivity τA
τˆAp =
2
V 2M
ˆC2ARp ,
having variance
Var(τˆAp) = 8
m
τA
(
τA +
τB
2
)[
1+ Vp,N(
τA + τB2
)
VM
]
. (15)
We notice that it differs from the formula of Eq. (14) for the
expression of Vp,N , given in Eq. (10). Now, from Eqs. (14)
and (15), we calculate the optimum linear combination of the
variances of the two estimators:
Var(τˆA) =
Var(τˆAq )Var(τˆAp)
Var(τˆAq )+ Var(τˆAp)
:= σ 2A. (16)
The same steps can be performed to obtain the relevant esti-
mators for transmissivity τB and the corresponding variance
Var(τˆB) = σ 2B .
Now we write the estimator of the variance of the excess
noise present on the communication links, Vq,ǫ . This can be
derived from the maximum likelihood estimator for Vq,N , and
it reads
ˆVq,ǫ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
[
Rq,i −
1√
2
(
√
τˆBBq,i −
√
τˆAAq,i)
]2
− 1,
(17)
with variance (Appendix C)
Var( ˆVq,ǫ) ≈ 2
m
V 2q,N := s2q . (18)
Correspondingly, we obtain an estimator for Vp,ǫ expressed as
ˆVp,ǫ =
1
m
∑
i=1
[
Rp,i −
1√
2
(
√
τˆBBp,i +
√
τˆAAp,i)
]2
− 1
(19)
and variance
Var( ˆVp,ǫ) ≈ 2
m
V 2p,N := s2p. (20)
Finally, from Eqs. (17) and (20) we compute the confidence
intervals and select the pessimistic values given by the
following choice of parameters:
τ lowA =τA − 6.5σA, τ lowB = τB − 6.5σB , (21)
V upq,ǫ =Vq,ǫ + 6.5sq , V upp,ǫ = Vp,ǫ + 6.5sp. (22)
B. Secret key rate with finite size effects
Once we have obtained the estimation of the transmissivi-
ties of the links and the corresponding excess noises, we can
write the key rate, incorporating finite-size effects writing
K = n
¯N
[
K∞
(
ξ,VM ,τ
low
A ,τ
low
B ,V
up
q,ǫ,V
up
p,ǫ
)−(n)], (23)
where n = ¯N −m is the number of signals used to prepare
the key and ¯N is the total number of signals exchanged. The
key rate is then computed replacing the values of Eqs. (21)
and (22) in the asymptotic key rate of Eq. (6). In particular,
the first one computes the key rate R of Eq. (23), using the
Holevo function of Eq. (3) for the channel parameters given
by Eqs. (21) and (22). Then, in order to account for the penalty
for using the Holevo function even if we have a finite number
of signals exchanged, one must include the correction term
(n) ∼
√
1
n
log2 2ε−1PA,
which depends on the number of signals used to prepare the
key, n, and the probability of error related to the privacy
amplification procedure εPA. A detailed description of this
correction term can be found in Ref. [59].
IV. RESULTS
The key rate of the asymmetric configuration of the
relay is described in Fig. 2(a). We plot the key rate as a
function of Bob’s channel transmissivity, expressed in terms
of dB of attenuation, while the transmissivity of Alice’s link
is set to τA = 0.98. The curves are obtained considering
two-mode optimal attacks, for which g = −g′ with g =
min [√(ωA − 1)(ωB + 1),
√(ωB − 1)(ωA + 1))] and ωA ∼
ωB ∼ 1.01 [50] and using the key rate of Eq. (23) incorporating
also finite-size effects. The efficiency of classical code for error
correction and reconciliation efficiency is set to ξ = 0.98,
and the final key rate is optimized over the variance of the
Gaussian modulation VM (see Fig. 3) and the ratio r = n/ ¯N .
The black solid line gives the asymptotic key rate for very large
¯N (>> 109), while the dashed line is for block size ¯N = 109
and the dot-dashed line is obtained for ¯N = 106.
The bottom panel in Fig. 2(b) plots the secret key rate for the
symmetric case [51] (τA = τB). The curves are obtained setting
all the other parameters as in Fig. 2(a) and optimizing the key
rate as before for the case including finite-size effects. The
black solid line describes again the asymptotic case ¯N →∞ of
the symmetric configuration while the dashed lines is obtained
for ¯N = 109 and the dotted one for ¯N = 106.
Let us finally remark on a couple of points. First, we notice
that the performance of finite-size CV-MDI-QKD converges
to the ideal one if the number of signals exchanged increases.
Second, according to the plots, we notice that the key rate
of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol is sufficiently robust with
respect to the finite-size effects, with block sizes of 109 points
approaching the asymptotic limit.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have studied the security of Gaussian
CV-MDI QKD, taking into account finite-size effects. These
emerge when one assumes that the parties exchange only a
finite number of signals during the quantum communication
stage. In our analysis, we assumed imperfect efficiency of error
correction and privacy amplification (ξ < 1) and developed the
finite-size analysis adapting the channel parameters estimation
approach described in Ref. [60]. The resulting finite-size key
rate has then been optimized over the Gaussian modulation
and the number of signals used to perform the parameter
estimation.
042332-4
FINITE-SIZE ANALYSIS OF MEASUREMENT-DEVICE- . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW A 96, 042332 (2017)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10−4
10−2
100
Bob’s channel attenuation (dB)
K
 (b
its
/us
e)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
10−4
10−2
100
Attenuation  (dB)
K
 (b
its
/us
e)
Asymmetric
configuration
Symmetric
configuration
N=∞
N=106
N=106
N=109
(b)
(a)
*
*
(  )
(  )
N=109
N=∞
FIG. 2. The figure summarizes the impact of finite-size effects
on the performance of CV-MDI QKD for both asymmetric (a) and
symmetric (b) configurations of the relay, in the presence of optimal
two-mode attack. In panel (a), the key rate is plotted as a function of
the dB of attenuation on Bob’s channel, with the relay placed near
Alice τA = 0.98. From top to bottom, the black curves describe the
rate for ¯N ≫ 1 with ξ = 0.98 and optimizing over VM (solid line).
Then we have the cases with finite block size. The dashed line is for
¯N = 109 while the dot-dashed curve is obtained for ¯N = 106. In all
cases, the excess noise is about 0.01 SNU. The red curves (*) describe
the case obtained for pure loss and assuming ξ = 1, VM →∞, ¯N →
∞ (solid line) and ¯N = 109 (dashed line). Panel (b) focuses on the
symmetric configuration of the relay. The curves are obtained using
the same parameters as in panel (a), but setting τA = τB = τ .
Our results show that when also considering finite-
size effects under realistic conditions, CV-MDI QKD over
metropolitan distances is feasible within today’s state-of-the-
art experimental conditions. In particular, we found that the
adoption of block size in the range ¯N = 106 ÷ 109 is already
sufficient in order to achieve a high key rate of 10−2 bits/use
over metropolitan distances, and in the presence of an excess
noise of about 0.01 SNU.
Finally, we underline that the present analysis is not the final
word on the performances of finite-size CV-MDI QKD. The
validity of the described analysis is in fact restricted to the case
of Gaussian attacks. Further studies are needed where finite-
size effects are investigated within the composable security
framework.
0 100 200 300 400 500
0.05
0.1
0.15
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K
  (b
its
/us
e)
FIG. 3. This figure shows the impact of the reconciliation effi-
ciency on the key rate. When ξ = 0.95 (dashed line), the Gaussian
modulation maximizing the key rate is VM <∞. While when ξ = 1
then the optimal key rate is obtained for VM →∞ (solid line). The
lines are obtained for pure loss attack, τA = 0.98 and τB = 0.7, and
block size ¯N = 106.
See Ref. [73] for a fully composable security proof of CV-
MDI-QKD.
Note added. Recently, an independent work [74] has been
posted on the arXiv. This work also studies the impact of
finite-size blocks on the key rate of CV-MDI QKD.
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APPENDIX A: COVARIANCE MATRICES
AND SYMPLECTIC EIGENVALUES
For the sake of clarity, in this section we rewrite the CMs
and the relevant symplectic eigenvalues derived in Ref. [50]
using the notation adopted in the main text. The CM describing
the total output state of Alice and Bob, after the relay
measurements, ρab|γ , is given by the following expression:
Vab|γ =
((VM + 1)I 0
0 (VM + 1)I
)
− VM (VM + 2)
×
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
τA
ϕ
0 −
√
τAτB
ϕ
0
0 τA
ϕ′ 0
√
τAτB
ϕ′
−
√
τAτB
ϕ
0 τB
ϕ
0
0
√
τAτB
ϕ′ 0
τB
ϕ′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠, (A1)
where
ϕ = (τA + τB)VM + 2+ 2Vǫ,g, (A2)
ϕ′ = (τA + τB)VM + 2+ 2Vǫ,g′ , (A3)
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and where we have defined
Vǫ,g = 12
(
τ¯B(ωB − 1)+ τ¯A(ωA − 1)− 2g
√
τ¯B τ¯A
)
, (A4)
Vǫ,g′ = 12
(
τ¯B(ωB − 1)+ τ¯A(ωA − 1)+ 2g′
√
τ¯B τ¯A
)
, (A5)
with τ¯l = 1− τl , for l = A,B.
Bob’s output CM after the double conditioning, first
with respect the relay measurements and then after Alice’s
heterodyne detection, Vab|γ , is given by
Vb|γα =
( 2(VM+1)(1+Vǫ,g )−τBVM
2(1+Vǫ,g )+τBVM 0
0 2(VM+1)(1+Vǫ,g′ )−τBVM2(1+Vǫ,g′ )+τBVM
)
,
which has the following symplectic eigenvalue given by the√
. of the determinant of previous matrix
ν¯ =
√
det Vb|γα. (A6)
APPENDIX B: USEFUL ELEMENTS
OF ESTIMATION THEORY
According to the method of maximum likelihood estima-
tion, for a bivariate normal distribution X = (X1,X2), the
estimators for the mean μ = (μ1,μ2) and the covariance
matrix V are given by
µˆ = 1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi, (B1)
V̂ = 1
m
m∑
i=1
(Xi − µˆ)(Xi − µˆ)T , (B2)
where Xi is the ith statistical realization out of m realizations
of X.
The central limit theorem states that, assuming m realiza-
tions X1,X2, . . . ,Xm (m≫ 1) of a random variable X with
unknown density function f , mean μ, and variance σ 2 <∞,
the sample mean
¯X = 1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi (B3)
is approximately normal with mean μ and variance σ 2/m. In
order to estimate the mean value of a variable Y , that depends
on the square of a variableX for which we havem realizations,
we can use the following result: For m realizations Xi , for
i = 1,2, . . . ,m, of a normally distributed variable X, having
mean μ and unit variance, the variable
Y =
m∑
i=1
X2i ∼ χ2(k,λ) (B4)
is distributed according to the χ2 distribution with k = m
degrees of freedom and λ = mμ2. The mean value and
variance of the χ2 distribution is given by
E(Y ) = k + λ (B5)
and
Var(Y ) = 2(k + 2λ). (B6)
Let us assume to have two estimators sˆ1 and sˆ2, with
variances σ 21 and σ 22 , for the same quantity s acquired by
different processes. We then compute the optimal linear
combination of the variances by the following formula:
σ 2opt =
σ 21 σ
2
2
σ 21 + σ 22
. (B7)
APPENDIX C: VARIANCES OF THE CHANNEL
PARAMETER ESTIMATORS
Let us suppose that Aq,i (Bq,i) are independent variables,
each one following the normal distribution qA (qB) with
zero mean and variance VM as described in Subsec. III A.
Accordingly, Rq,i (Rp,i) are assumed to be independent
variables following the normal distribution of qR (pR), i.e.,
the relay output variable.
1. Variance of the transmissivity
For the covariance between modes A and R, we can write
the following estimator,
ˆCARq =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Aq,iRq,i, (C1)
normally distributed as the sample mean of variable Z =
AqRq . We can compute the expectation value by
E( ˆCARq ) = E(qAqR) =
√
τA
2
VM = CARq , (C2)
and the variance can be defined as
VCov := Var( ˆCARq ) (C3)
with
Var( ˆCARq ) =
1
m
Var (qAqR)
= 1
2m
[
τAVar
(
q2A
)+ τBVar(qAqB)]
+Var(qAqN ), (C4)
= 1
m
(
τAV
2
M +
τB
2
V 2M + VMVq,N
)
= 1
m
(
τA +
τB
2
)
V 2M
[
1+ Vq,N(
τA + τB2
)
VM
]
, (C5)
where we have considered the independence of the variables
and the second-order moments of the normal distribution.
Therefore, we can derive the mean and variance for the
estimator of τA. We rewrite the estimator as
τˆAq =
2VCov
V 2M
(
ˆCARq√
VCov
)2
. (C6)
Note that the variable ( ˆCARq/
√
VCov)2 is χ2 distributed, i.e.,(
ˆCARq√
VCov
)2
∼ χ2
[
1,
(
CARq√
VCov
)2]
, (C7)
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with expectation value
E
⎡⎣( ˆCARq√
VCov
)2⎤⎦ = 1+ ( CARq√
VCov
)2
(C8)
and variance
Var
⎡⎣( ˆCARq√
VCov
)2⎤⎦ = 2[1+ 2( CARq√
VCov
)2]
. (C9)
The expectation value of τˆAq is then given by
E(τˆAq) = 2VCov
V 2M
[
1+
(
CARq√
VCov
)2]
=
2C2ARq
V 2M
+O(1/m) = τA +O(1/m) (C10)
and its variance is
Var(τˆAq) =
4V 2Cov
V 4M
2
[
1+ 2
(
CARq√
VCov
)2]
=
16VCovC2ARq
V 4M
+O(1/m2). (C11)
By replacing Eqs. (C2) and (C5), we obtain
Var(τˆAq) = 16
mV 4M
(
τA +
τB
2
)
V 4MτA
2
[
1+ Vq,N(
τA + τB2
)
VM
]
+O(1/m2), (C12)
= 8τA
m
(
τA +
τB
2
)[
1+ Vq,N(
τA + τB2
)
VM
]
+O(1/m2). (C13)
Clearly, as previously noted in Ref. [60], the estimator of the
transmissivity τˆAq is only asymptotically unbiased. In fact, the
standard deviation
√
Var(τˆAq) is of order 1/
√
m while the bias
goes as 1/m. As we consider m > 105 in our analysis, the
value of the bias become rapidly negligible as m≫ 1, and the
use of estimators τˆA and τˆB are very accurate.
2. Variance of the excess noise
Also in our estimation procedure for the MDI protocol, in
analogy to the theory developed in Ref. [60], the variance of
the estimator can be obtained replacing the estimator of τA
(τB) with its value. This simplifies the calculations. Now, we
can assume that any uncertainty in the estimator of the excess
noise obtained from broadcast results of relay’s measurements
on quadrature q
ˆVq,ǫ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
[
Rq,i −
√
τˆBBq,i −
√
τˆAAq,i√
2
]2
− 1 (C14)
comes only from variables Rq,i, Aq,i , and Bq,i . We then
have that the expression inside square brackets is normally
distributed with zero mean and variance Vq,N . In addition to
this, one also has that the following expression
Y :=
m∑
i=1
(
Rq,i−
(√
τBBq,i−√τAAq,i
)
/
√
2√
Vq,N
)2
∼ χ2(m,0)
(C15)
is χ2 distributed and has mean E(Y ) = m and variance
Var(Y ) = 2m. This allows us to approximate the sum of
Eq. (C14) with Vq,NY when we assume large values for m,
obtaining the expectation value
E( ˆVq,ǫ) ≈ 1
m
Vq,NE(Y )− 1 = Vq,ǫ (C16)
and the variance
Var( ˆVq,ǫ) ≈ 1
m2
V 2q,NVar(Y ) =
2
m
V 2q,N . (C17)
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